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Abstract
A new statistical procedure of anti-corruption control of economic
activity is proposed in the paper. The task of the firm’s corruption
checking is formulated in terms of statistical hypothesis testing. To
make checking procedure more rigorous, it is proposed to formulate a
hypothesis regarding the current, not the average data, as is customary
in classical statistics.
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1 Introduction
In the last decades mathematical modeling of socioeconomic systems and pro-
cesses have received definite status of the legal existence (e.g. [1-21] and ref-
erences therein) . Here we demonstrate how mathematical statistics methods
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help to reveal corrupt activity in firms. The ability to counteract corrupt ac-
tivities of firms is limited due to its hidden nature, extent of its dissemination,
and, accordingly, a lack of resources to identify these ones. In this regard, a
sufficiently reliable criteria for the evaluation of the presence of indirect indica-
tors of corruption in firms is of particular relevance. Several studies have shown
[21] that the circumstantial evidence of corruption in the sphere of economic
activity includes: the short time of tendering, the inflated volume of the ten-
der, the violation of the procedure of filing the application, the violation of the
deadline for the submission of the application, the filing of a complaint from
losing bidders, changes in the contract compared with the bid, the winning
bidder has not declared all its participants, and so on.
2 The estimation of the corruption area bound-
ary
Suppose that k indirect corruption indicators {x1, x2, . . . , xk} are selected as
components of the vector X = (x1, x2, . . . , xk)
T (T is a transposition opera-
tor). Let Rc ⊂ Rk be the corruption area. Assume that the vector X obeys
a multivariate normal distribution. This assumption is valid when the distri-
bution is sufficiently localized in the area of admissible values. The boundary
of the region Rc can be determined statistically by the data sample values
{Xj, j = 1, 2, . . . , n}, obtained on the basis of the accounting statements of
firms whose economic activity is of a corrupt nature.
Compute the estimate vector of the average values
Θc = n
−1 ∑
j=1,...,n
(Xj) (1)
and the matrix of cross-covariances
Vc = (n− 1)−1
∑
j=1,...,n
(Xj −Θc)(Xj −Θc)T. (2)
The degeneracy of the matrix Vc means the dependence of selected indirect
corruption indicators and points to the necessity to reduce their list . The
boundary of the corruption area Rc, given that, by assumption, X obeys a
multivariate normal distribution, i.e. X ∼ N(Θc,Vc), can be defined in two
different ways: as elliptic hypersurface, or a hyperplane. In the first case we
have
Wc = {X : fc(X) = cα}
Here, the probability density function fc(X) = f(X,Θc,Vc) is defined by the
formula
fc(X) = (2pi)
−k/2(detVc)−1/2 exp(−0.5(X−Θc)TV−1c (X−Θc)),
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. The value of the constant cα is such that the probability measure for the
distribution N(Θc,Vc) inside the ellipsoid Wc, i.e. Rc, is equal to 1−α. Note
that the ellipsoid Wc, might go beyond the boundary of the admissible values
of the vector X region . Then a probability estimation should be calculated
in terms of conditional probabilities. This remark also applies to probability
estimation discussed below. The second approach to evaluating the boundaries
of the Rc is similar to E. Altman’s method [1], [17]. Let the orthogonal matrix
P be computed so that
PTVcP = Λc = diag(λ1, λ2, . . . , λk).
Columns of the matrix P can be placed in such a manner as to satisfy
the condition λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ . . . λk. Then one can take a hyperplane φc = {X :
PTk X = δα}, as the boundary of Rc where Pk is the last column of the matrix
P corresponding to the smallest eigenvalue (λk). The sum of the squared
deviations of all values Xj from hyperplane φ0 = {X : PTk X = PTk Θc} equals
to the minimum value (n−1)λk, i.e. the hyperplane φ0 reproduces the original
sample with minimal quadratic error. The value of constant δα should be
calculated based on the selected level of confidence (1−α), as the boundary of
the left-sided critical region for Student random variable (λk)
−1/2PTk (X−Θc),
i.e.
δα = P
T
k Θc − λ1/2k tα/2n−1
(t
α/2
n−1 is quantile of the Student distribution). This means that for corrupt
firms the probability to be occurred below the level δα is equal to α/2, since
the Student test is the two-sided one.
3 Probability estimation of corruption absence
in the firm analysed
Suppose that for some firm B ”analyzed for corruption” there observations
{Xt, t = 1, 2, . . . , TB},are given for some time period TB. Assume that the
values of Xt aren’t included in Rc, because otherwise the economic activity
of the firm would be considered as corrupt. Making use of formulas (1) and
(2), we calculate similar estimates for the parameters ΘB and VB, assuming
that the vector of indices X of the estimated firms obeys a multivariate normal
distribution X ∼ N(ΘB,VB), which indirectly corresponds to the assumption
of corruption absence.
The probability measure of corruption absence may be defined as a proba-
bility measure (distribution N(ΘB,VB)) of the interior of the ellipsoid WB =
{X : fB(X,ΘB,VB) = f∗, where fB(X∗) = f∗}. The value of X∗ is calculated
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as the extremum point of the Lagrange function
L(X, λ) = ln fB(X)− λ(ln fc(X)− ln cα) (3)
when the boundary of Rc is defined as the ellipsoid Wc (the logarithm in (3)
is used to simplify the differentiation) and
L(X, λ) = ln fB(X)− λ(PTkX− δα),
when the boundary Rc is defined as the hyperplane φc. In the latter case, the
solution is quite simple:
λ = (δα −PTk ΘB)(PTk VBPk)−1,
X∗ = ΘB + λVBPk.
Geometrically, the point X∗ is the point of contact of the ellipsoid WB
with boundary Rc [17], [18]. Now, taking a confidence level 1 − α (here the
choice does not depend on the construction of the boundary Rc), compare
with it the probability measure P (IntWB) of the interior of the ellipsoid WB.
If P (IntWB) > 1− α, the economic activity of the firm is not heavily corrupt,
if P (IntWB) ≤ 1− α, this should be treated as a signal for more rigid control.
4 Check for corruption in terms of statistical
hypotheses
According to the classical theory of hypotheses testing here would be to test
the hypothesis Hc : ΘB ∈ Rc. As shown in [17], it is enough to verify the
hypothesis H∗ : ΘB = X∗. However, the scale of variation of the average
values (ΘB) for the analyzed firm will be, as is known, the T
1/2
B times smaller
than the scale of variation of the immediate values (X), since under the cor-
rect hypothesis H∗ estimating of ΘB obeys the distribution N(X∗, T−1B VB).
This makes it relatively non-sensitive to checking of the firm, whose economic
corrupt action was of an episodic nature. In this regard, we should test the
hypothesis H ′c : X ∈ Rc(H ′∗ : X = X∗). This hypothesis uses the distribution
of indirect corruption indicators (component s of X). It is interpreted as abuse
of firm economic actions of corruption character. This approach is consistent
with probabilistic estimates of section 2. Appropriate statistics under these
assumptions are components of the vector
s = (s1, s2, . . . , sk)
T = (ΛB)
−1/2QT(X∗ −ΘB),
Statistical estimation of corruption indicators in the firm 2069
which has Student’s distribution with number of freedom degrees (TB − 1).
Here Q is an orthogonal matrix such that the matrix QTVBQ = ΛB has
diagonal form. In addition, the value
r = (X∗ −ΘB)TV−1B (X∗ −ΘB)
with the increase of the sample size TB asymptotically approaches the dis-
tribution χ2 with the number of freedom degrees k. In the case where the
hypothesis H′c : X ∈ Rc(H′∗ : X = X∗) is not rejected by statistical test, the
company falls into the category of suspected of corrupt activities.
5 Example
Let’s consider a numerical example. Let’s assume for simplicity of exposition
that the number of indirect corruption indicators is reduced to two (k=2), and
the boundary of the corruption region is a straight line. Table 1 shows a sample
of values for the company’s activities within a certain period of observation.
This table represents the calculated average values, which are the coordinates
of the test point.
Table 1: Simulated data of test results
n x 1 x 2 n x 1 x 2
1 24 1 11 38 3
2 32 41 12 19 11
3 35 38 13 29 29
4 36 39 14 39 3
5 24 12 15 19 8
6 34 39 16 21 15
7 38 41 17 3 21
8 17 8 18 37 32
9 29 7 19 16 12
10 2 13 20 33 3
Average value 26,25 18,8
Making use of the table 1 data calculate matrices VB =
(
123, 250 53, 842
53, 842 215, 432
)
,
Q =
(
0, 418147 0, 90838
−0, 90838 0, 418147
)
,ΛB = diag(240, 216; 98, 466).
For the illustrative purpose, we assume that the corruption area lies on the
straight line 0, 75x1 + 0, 25x2 = 52 (Altman’s boundary). In this case, the test
point falls in the safe region.
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Figure 1: The arrangement of the elements of statistical analysis:1 – test point;
2 – nearest boundary point;3 – boundary point of maximum likelihood
Table 2 shows the coordinates of boundary points nearest to the test point
and the coordinates of the boundary points of the maximum likelihood (all
three points are presented in Fig.1). This table contains the values of the test
according to Student criterion. The sample size is not so big to consider the
distribution of the magnitude (5) sufficiently similar χ2.
Table 2: The results of the statistical test
Boundary points x1 x2 t
| s1 | | s2 |
Closest point 59,385 29,845 1,541 2,568
The point of maximum
likelihood
54,644 44,068 2,247 1,534
Critical value α = 0, 05 t0,02519 = 2, 433
As can be seen from the table 2, for the nearest boundary points one of the
Student statistics exceeds the critical value, so it can give a false confidence
of the tested company to be free of corruption. However, for the point of
maximum likelihood, both statistics are in the confidence region. Thus, despite
the fact that, on average, the tested firm is estimated as free of corrupt, in
principle this one may commit acts of corruption character. Such firm must
be subject to appropriate additional monitoring.
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6 Conclusion
The statistical estimation procedure proposed in the paper significantly ex-
pands the possibilities of control of firms economic activity with regards to
its corruption activity. However, the estimation procedure is becoming more
rigorous and more sensitive to changes of indirect corruption indicators in firm
economic activity. The procedure can be used also in other fields of mathe-
matical modeling. It is shown that the corrupt checking of the system with a
large number of parameters may need to test a complicated hypothesis that
arises from restrictions on the parameters. It is shown that the verification
of this complex hypothesis is reduced to the verification of simple hypotheses
about boundary point, which gives the maximum likelihood. This fact and
the algorithm proposed here significantly expands the possibilities of adequate
testing for the corruption in the complex multiparameter structures and sys-
tems, increasing the reliability of findings and conclusions.
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